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Abstract
Corporate governance is not a new concept. In fact the last 15 years has seen a surge in academic publications
and case law in relation to the lack of corporate governance. Research Gap is that Company Directors are
attending a “mad hatters’ tea party” when it comes to the implementation of governance codes, with the recent
spate of court cases involving breaches of directors fiduciary duties. Methodology used was review of case
law using archival data. This research looks at the type of case law issues of corporate governance in Australia
and in particular accountability, and relates the case law to the Corporations Act (2001) to find where company
directors are getting corporate governance wrong. The findings indicate that perhaps the “if not why not”
prescription, should not be an option for corporate governance for some Boards. For some Boards the
invitation from Alice to jump down the rabbit hole into creative accounting and bad board behaviour at the
“mad hatters’ tea party” is just too great an incentive. Implications show that this review of important corporate
governance case law will assist Boards to concentrate their efforts on improving the environment they operate
in, as good governance equates to good business.
“In another moment down went Alice after it, never once considering how in the world she was to
get out again.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) Alice's Adventures in Wonderland
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1.

Corporate Governance Introduction

Corporate governance refers to the relationship among different participants, and defining the corporation’s
direction and performance, which includes the CEO, i.e., the management team, the board of directors, and the
shareholders (Prasad, 2006). From the agency perspective, corporate governance is "a system of law and sound
approaches by which corporations are directed and controlled focusing on the internal and external corporate
structures with the intention of monitoring the actions of management and directors and thereby mitigating agency
risks which may stem from the misdeeds of corporate officers" (Sifuna & Anazett, 2012). Separation of ownership
and control in the modern corporations became an issue by Berle and Means (1932). Recent research shows that
there are lots of concentrations of ownership among the largest American companies (Demsetz, 1983; Shleifer &
Vishny, 1986; Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988), and that a relative higher level of ownership concentration exists
in other developed and developing countries outside the US (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny,
1998).
Corporate governance has been the subject of extensive scrutiny and controversy, particularly after the corporate
collapses of the 2000s and the recent global financial crisis. Much of the controversy started in the Western
countries, inspired by the early study of Berle and Means (1932). This classic analysis of corporation control call
into question the justification for shareholder wealth and raise a problem of social ethics. But Berles’ observation
shows a lack of empirical justification for the claims held by the shareholders. Fama and Jensen (1983) advocate
the financial theory of risk-bearing which hinges on the separation of decision management and residual riskbearing in the corporation. This separation and specialization of decision management and residual risk-bearing
leads to an agency problem between agents and principals (Fama & Jensen, 1983). The governance problem is
that those who bear the residual risk have no assurance that the managers will act in the shareholder best interests,
and therefore bring in the costs of monitoring and preventing the exercise of such discretion described as agency
cost. The pre-occupation for corporate governance then is to mitigate the agency problem and agency cost between
shareholders and managers. One of the possibilities is to use corporate governance as the mechanism for governing
including boards of directors and to ensure sustainability through the financial structure as proposed by Jensen
(1986).
The World Bank defines corporate governance as the set of mechanisms available to shareholders for influencing
managers to maximize the value of shareholder’s stock and to fixed claimants for controlling the agency costs of
equity. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) defines corporate governance as
a set of relationships among management, company board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Both of them
imply the principal-agent model of the corporation, and emphasise the importance of shareholder interest and
company value. Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) define corporate governance as a set of mechanisms to assure
financiers that they will get a return on their investment. Corporate Governance then is an evolving concept. It
dates back to the Code of Hammurabi back in 1800BC when bartering traders agreed to the basic rules of business
transactions. The following table shows some of the international corporate governance regimes currently in place.
Table 1: Timeline
Date
Document Name
1800 BC Code of Hammurabi
1991
Bosch Committee – Corporate
Practices and Conduct (1995)
1992
Cadbury Committee Report (UK)
1993
Hilmer Report (Australia)
1995
Vienot Report (France)
1995

Date
1999
2001

Document Name
OECD Principles of Corporate Governance
Ramsay Report (Australia)

2002
2003
2003

Sarbanes Oxley Act 2002 (US)
Combined Code Corporate Governance (UK)
ASX Good Corporate Governance and Best
Practice
AS 8000 - 2003 Standards (Australia)
CLERP 9 Act 2004 (Australia)

2003
2004

1997

Toronto Stock Exchange
recommendations on Canadian
Board practices (Canada)
Report on Corporate Governance in
Hong Kong
King Report (South Africa)

1997
1998
1998

Netherlands Report (Netherlands)
Hampel Report (UK)
Olivencia Report (Spain)

2012
2017
2019

1996

2004
2010

Corporate Governance in New Zealand
Principles and Guidelines
Corporate Governance Principles &
Recommendations 2010 Amendments (ASX)
UK Corporate Governance Code
Amendments as necessary
Corporate Governance Principles &
Recommendations 2019 Amendments (ASX)

2.

Method

This research uses archival data to compare current case law activities to that of the prescribed Corporation Act
2001 and the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019). It also uses case studies of each of the
case law to develop an in depth analysis of the case to enable the comparison to be made to legal obligations of
Corporations Act 2001 and the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019), as described by
Creswell & Creswell (2018).
Countries that have good corporate governance systems become not only attractive locations for domestic
companies to develop and invest (La Porta, et al., 1998), but also for foreign investors, and thus promote economic
growth (Levine, 1999). However, corporate governance practices are different from country to country.
Companies in different countries are operating in different social, cultural, legal and economic environments, as
a result, each country has developed its own corporate governance system that serves its business operations best
(La Porta, et al., 1998). This paper investigates the most significant cases that have helped to shape the current
corporate laws in Australia in relation to corporate governance. It also shows the link between the directors’ duties
as imposed by law (Corporations Act 2001) and the Australian Securities Exchange corporate governance
recommendations (2019) that listed companies must comply with.
“How puzzling all these changes are! I'm never sure what I'm going to be, from one minute
another.” Carroll, Lewis(1865), “Alice's Adventures in Wonderland”
This leads to the Research Problem of “How have the Corporations Act (2001) for company directors duties and
the corporate governance regimes recommended by ASX (2019), been complied with by listed companies in
Australia in the last 10 years”. Research Question 1: Can the directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act
(2001) relate to the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)? Research Question 2: What
directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court activity in the last 15 years? To address the research
problem, an organised, systematic and logical process of research method, using secondary data will be used. The
use of archival data involves the research into case law of court cases involving the Corporations Act (2001)
breaches.
3.

Results

4.
In order to answer Research Question 1: “Can directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to
the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)” directors duties must be investigated in terms
of the specific references in the Corporations Act (CA) 2001 legislation. The difference between Common Law
duties and Equitable Fiduciary duties must be ascertained, and specifically linked to a section of the act. Directors
duties are broken down into Common Law duties and Equitable Fiduciary Duties. Under the Corporations Act
(S185), there are specific sections on directors’ duties, such as S180 Reasonable care and diligence, S181 Good
faith and proper purpose, S182 Conflict of interest, S183 Confidential information, S184 Criminal liability,
S588G2/3 Insolvent Trading and Personal liability, and s1043A Insider trading.
Specifically then under common law duties, a breach of section 180 Reasonable Case and Diligence or section
181 Good faith and proper purpose, will result in the use of section of S588G(2) which will result in personally
liable penalties. Under the equitable fiduciary duties section of the Corporate Act (2001), section 182 conflict of
interest and section 183 confidential information will able be in breach of director duties. Other penalties under
the act include Criminal liability (s184), as well and other breaches such as Insolvent trading S588G (3) and
Insider Trading (S1043A).
The commonwealth government recognises that all of these laws place a heavy burden on directors, and has
encouraged the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) to review these in light of state legislations.
Nicholson and Underhill (2012) discuss the “Personal Liability for Corporate Fault Reform Bill” that imposes
personal liability on company officers for offences committed by corporations. The reforms came from the 2009
Council of Australian Governments (COAG) which intends to harmonise corporate wrongs with personal criminal
liability. This has been replaced by the Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Directors’ Liability) Act No. 2, 2011
(NSW) (2011 Act) and was subsequently replaced by the Miscellaneous Acts Amendment (Directors’ Liability)
Act 2012 (NSW) (2012 Act), which commenced on 11 th January 2013.
Particularly after the corporate collapse era of 2000s, many countries have adopted some form of governance code
such as that of the Corporate Governance Council of Australia, with their Best Practice Recommendations for
listed companies on the Australian Securities Exchange (2019). Although these are recommendations only, for
listed companies in Australia, listing rule 4.10 dictates that companies must address each of these governance

initiatives, and explain if they have not adopted the recommendation (if not why not). In particular for listing
companies in Australia it is important to link the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019) to
that of their Corporations Act (2001) obligations as shown in table 2.
In order to answer Research Question 1: “Can directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to
the Corporate Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019)”, table 2 suggests there is a direct link between
the application of the good governance recommendations by the ASX (2010) and the application of the
Corporations Act (2001) for any breaches of those recommendations by directors. Directors therefore should be
aware that even though the governance recommendations have an “if not why not” regime, that a breach of the
recommendation can be directly linked to a breach of the Corporations Act (2001) which could lead to criminal
or civil personal liability for Directors actions.
“I don't think..." then you shouldn't talk, said the Hatter.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in
Wonderland”
Table 2: ASX (2019) and CA (2001)
ASX 2019
1:
Solid
foundations
for
management & oversight
2: Structure Board to be effective
and add value
3: Instil a culture of acting lawfully,
ethically & responsibly
4: Safeguard integrity of corporate
reports
5: Make timely and balanced
disclosure
6: Respect the rights of security
holders
7: Recognise and manage risk

8:Remunerate fairly and responsibly

Corporations Act 2001
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180, Good faith and proper purpose
S181
Personally Liable S588G(2)
Criminal Liability S184, Reasonable Care and Diligence S180
Personally Liable S588G (2)
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180
Conflict of Interest S182, Confidential Information S183
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180
Insolvent Trading S588G (3), Insider Trading S1043A
Good Faith and Proper Purpose S181
Insolvent Trading S588G (3), Insider Trading S1043A, Good Faith
and Proper Purpose S181. Reasonable Care and Due Diligence S180,
Conflict of Interest S182, Confidential Information S183
Reasonable Care and Diligence S180

In order to answer Research Question 2: “What directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court activity
in the last 15 years?” the following tables have been divided by sections of the Corporations Act in relation to
breaches of directors duties, and then linked to the corporate governance recommendations.
Table 3: Personally Liable S588G (2)
Case Name
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v
Friedrich 5 ACSR 115: 9 ACLC
946
ASIC v Narain FCAFC 120

Breach of Law Companies Act
S588G(2) director found to be personally liable for debts incurred by
the company, as the loan was fraudulent and he should not have
signed annual report. ASX 2 & 3 breach.
Misleading information regarding chemicals and claims it could stop
spread of disease that was not backed up by medical advice.
Managing director held personally liable for the statements 588G(2).
ASX 3 breach.

Table 4: Good Faith and Proper Purpose S181
Case Name
Breach of Law Companies Act
R v Byrnes and Hopwood (1995)
Court found that officers could still be in breach of duties even when
183 CLR 501; (1995) 130 ALR 529 they thought it would benefit the company, but for an improper
purpose S181. ASX 1 & 7 breach.
ASIC v Rich44ACSR 341: 21 ACLC Non-executive chair failed to act with proper case and diligence, it
450 - One.Tel
also deals with the business judgement rule S181. ASX 1 & 6 breach.

Table 5: Confidential Information S183/Insider Trading S1043A
Case Name
Breach of Law Companies Act
R v Firns 51 NSWLR 548: 38 ACSR Held that it is was insider trading under s1034A as the information
223
was publically available even if no one had observed it. ASX 6
breach.
ASIC v Southcorp Wines 203 ALR
Contravened continuous disclosure rules by communicating the
627: 22 ACLC 1
analysts before notifying ASIC S674(2), S183. ASX 3 breach.
R v Rivkin 198 ALR 400: 45 ACSR Insider trading held s1043A as information that was material and not
366
publically available was used to buy shares. Court imposed detention
and a fine.
ASX 3 & 7 breach.
ASIC v Wizard 145 FCR 57: 219
Insider trading breach s183, S1043A in that information obtained as a
ALR 714
director that was not publically available was used for their own
purposes to purchase shares in other companies (even though they
made losses). Fined $400,000 and disqualified from being a director
for 10 years. ASX 3, 6 & 7 breach.
Table 6: Minority Shareholder Rights S136
Case Name
Gambotto v WCP 182 CLR 432:
127 ALR 4147

Finding / Description
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001
Minority shareholder case where a proposed amendment to the
constitution and subsequent compulsory acquisition was invalid. To
avoid administration and taxation costs was not a valid and proper
purpose S136. ASX 6 breach.

Table 7: Reasonable Care and Due Diligence S180
Case Name
AWA Ltd v Daniels t/as Deloitte
Haskins and Sells 7 ACSR 759

Vines v ASIC 55 ACSR 617: 23
ACLC 1387 - GIO
The Bell Group Ltd (in liquidation)
v Westpac Banking Corporation
(No 9) [2008] WASC 239
ASIC v Narain FCAFC 120

Jubliee Mines NL v Riley 253 ALR
673: 69 ACSR 659

ASIC v Healy 2011 FCA 717
Centro Case
ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd
FCAFC 19

Finding / Description
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001
Problems with delegated authority and incorrect procedures for
reporting to a company board. An equal duty of care for both
executive and non-executive directors. That all should be familiar
with the business of the company. ASX 1 & 7 breach
Chief Financial Officer (CFO) duties of care and diligence, S180
negligence, and lack of due diligence in forecasting made public.
ASX 4 breach.
Directors duties to consider the interests of creditors in a restructure
for corporate debts. Banks were also found to assist in the directors
breach of duties and were fined.
ASX 3 breach.
Misleading information regarding chemicals and claims it could stop
spread of disease that was not backed up by medical advice.
Managing director was held personally liable for making the
statements. ASX 7 breach.
Continuous disclosure should be balanced with no misleading or
deceptive conduct. Principle of “when in doubt disclose” should be
considered carefully as company should not also mislead the market
with incomplete information. ASX 5 breach
S180(1) directors breach as inaccurate financial accounts were
approved. ASX 4 breach.
Held FMG and Managing director Andrew Forrest breach of
continuous disclosure for engaging in misleading or deceptive
conduct concerning ASX releases and investor briefings to the
signing of framework agreements with Chinese companies. In 2012
this was overturned on appeal. ASX 5 breach.

Table 8: Insolvent Trading S588G(3)
Case Name
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v
Friedrich 5 ACSR 115: 9 ACLC
946
ASIC v Plymin 46 ACSR 126: 21
ACLC 700. Elliott v ASIC 10 VR
369: 205 ALR 594.

Finding / Description
Breach of Law Companies Act 2001
S588G(2)/((3) director found to be personally liable for insolvent
trading for debts incurred by the company, as the loan was fraudulent
and he should not have signed annual reports with assets listed that
the business did not own. ASX 1 & 3 breach.
Breach of statutory duty to prevent insolvent trading. Under s588G
requires individual directors take reasonable steps to prevent a
company from incurring a debt. Banned from being a director and
fined $25,000 and $15,000 respectively. ASX 4 & 7 breach.

“If everybody minded their own business, the world would go around a great deal faster than it
does.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in Wonderland”
Research Question 1: Can the directors duties outlined in the Corporations Act (2001) relate to the Corporate
Governance recommendations by the ASX (2019) are demonstrated by table 2. The Research Question 2 of what
directors’ duties have been breached and resulted in court activity in the last 15 years, has been shown by tables
3 - 8.
5.

Discussion

Figure 2 is a model based on the interactions between Directors duties as prescribed by Corporations Law (2001)
and the ASX Good Governance Recommendations (2019) and court cases from the breaches. Entitled the
LAG/LEAD model, it represents how company directors can avoid the court system by instead of being reactive
(LAG) they can be proactive (LEAD) by exhibiting good corporate governance and compliance with Corporations
law.
Figure 2: LAG/LEAD Model for Company Directors
L LAWS Corporations Act 2001
S180 Reasonable Care and Diligence
S181 Good Faith and Proper Purpose
S182 Conflict of Interest
S183 Confidential Information
S184 Criminal Liability
S185 Interaction of S180 – 184 with other laws
Personally Liable S588G(2)
Insolvent Trading S588G(3)
Insider Trading S1043A

L LEADERSHIP
E ETHICS
A ACCOUNTABILITY
D DIRECTORS DUTIES

A ACCOUNTABILITY of Board of
Directors
Company Director Fiduciary Duties
Codes of Ethics, Policy and Procedures
CEO Recruitment, Support & Succession
Timely, balanced, integrity of reporting

G GOVERNANCE Recommendations 2019
Governance Foundations
Board to Effectively Add Value
Lawful, ethical & Responsible
Integrity of Corporate Reporting
Timely and Balanced Disclosure
Respect Security Holders Rights
Risk Management
Remuneration

The Business Judgement Rule s180(2) states that officers of a company are compliant with S180(1) if they made
a judgement in good faith for a proper purpose, they do not have any material personal interest, they inform
themselves about the subject matter to a reasonable level and they rationally believe that the judgement is for the
best interests of the corporation. Bryans (2011) discusses the James Hardie case in relation to non-executives
breaches of care and diligence in relation to ASX announcements that were misleading and failing to request a
copy of the announcement. In the Centro case for example, Giordano stated (2011) that the directors failed to
exercise their statutory duty of care and diligence in approving inaccurate accounts s180(1), statutory duty of care
and diligence, s344(1) (reasonable steps to comply with financial reporting duties) and s601FD(3) in the failure
of classifying $1.75 million USD as non-current when in fact they were short-term liabilities. In 2010 Heath in
discussing the ASIV v Rich cases (2009) stated that directors are not responsible for unforeseeable risks, and a

mistake or judgement of error does not automatically invoke s180(1) breaches, however Directors still must
understand company’s financial statements, a responsibility that cannot be avoided.
The answer to the Research Problem of: “How have the Corporations Act (2001) for company directors duties
and the corporate governance regimes recommended by ASX (2019), been complied with by listed companies in
Australia in the last 10 years?,” would be that every ASX governance recommendation (2019) and every company
directors duty imposed by Corporations Law (2001), has in the last 15 years been breached resulting in a court
case, with either criminal or civil liabilities imposed, so there is a lack of overall compliance by listed companies
in Australia.
Directors’ duties then are imposed on all Directors of all entities with serious consequences for breaches both on
a civil or criminal basis. This research has shown that corporate governance may mean different things to different
entities, but the Corporations Act (2001) is applied to ALL directors of ALL entities. Directors should be made
aware of these obligations. Adams (2004) describes corporate governance as being not unlike a beauty and a beast,
and that Directors who wish to do “good” should carry out diligence, compliance with regulation and adhere to
corporate governance recommendations. All these recommendations however only add more to the burden already
held by Directors both paid and voluntary. Directors of all Boards then, need to be vigilant, aware of their
obligations, fully informed and ethical in all decisions they make for and on behalf of their boards, the last thing
they want to see is their company in the courts, and their decision questioned by a judge.
“My dear, here we must run as fast as we can, just to stay in place. And if you wish to go anywhere
you must run twice as fast as that.” Carroll, Lewis (1865) “Alice in Wonderland”
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